The contemporary rise of far-right movements across Europe, North America, and beyond poses a major challenge for democratic societies. These movements often mobilise around themes of immigration, national identity, and resistance to social change. To understand their appeal, it is not enough to treat their supporters as simply uneducated, misinformed or irrational. Instead, psychological theories such as that of ‘motivated social cognition’ offer a richer framework. This perspective emphasises that political beliefs are shaped not only by facts but by the underlying psychological motives and needs of individuals. By examining the far right through this lens, we can also identify practical strategies for educators and activists seeking to challenge its influence.
The Theory of Motivated Social Cognition
Motivated social cognition rests on the idea that people’s cognitive processes – how they perceive, interpret, and remember information – are shaped by motivational forces. Rather than being neutral processors of evidence, individuals tend to favour conclusions that satisfy underlying psychological needs, such as the need for safety, certainty, and belonging (Kruglanski, 1990). Jost and colleagues (2003) synthesised decades of research to argue that political conservatism, and especially its authoritarian forms, often functions as a response to threat and uncertainty. In this account, conservatism provides a psychological buffer against discomfort by offering clear structure, stability, and a sense of order.
The roots of this approach can be traced back to Adorno et al.’s (1950) The Authoritarian Personality, which proposed that authoritarianism emerges from strict child-rearing practices that foster hostility toward authority and displacement onto weaker groups. Although methodologically flawed, that work established the idea that political ideology could be linked to personality traits and psychological defences. Later work refined these insights, highlighting two broad motivational factors: resistance to change and justification of inequality (Jost et al., 2003).
Far-Right Narratives as Psychological Comfort
The far right appeals not only because of its policy proposals but because it speaks directly to deep human needs. In times of uncertainty – economic downturn, demographic change, or environmental crisis – people experience anxiety about the future. Far-right narratives promise relief by offering simple explanations and clear targets. Immigration, for example, is framed as the cause of unemployment, crime, and cultural decline. Such explanations may be inaccurate, but they provide certainty and restore a sense of control. The world is rendered comprehensible: there is an enemy to blame and an authority that promises to protect.
This process can be seen as a form of need for closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Faced with ambiguity, some individuals prefer swift, firm answers, even at the expense of accuracy. Far-right ideology supplies these answers in a way that is emotionally reassuring, even if factually flawed.
System Justification and Inequality
Another dimension of motivated social cognition is system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994). People often prefer to believe that their social system is fair and stable, even when faced with clear evidence of injustice. This reduces cognitive dissonance and preserves the belief that life is predictable. Far-right rhetoric reinforces this tendency by insisting that social hierarchies are natural, whether grounded in culture, ethnicity, or religion. Inequality is thus reframed as the normal order of things. For individuals unsettled by social change, this worldview feels less threatening than acknowledging that structures of privilege might be arbitrary and unjust.
System justification helps explain why far-right supporters are resistant to counter-evidence. Data showing, for instance, that immigrants contribute more in taxes than they receive in welfare (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014) directly challenges the “fairness” of the system as they perceive it. Accepting such evidence would demand a painful rethinking of social order. Defensive rigidity (Adorno et al., 1950) emerges here: rejecting or reinterpreting facts becomes a psychological strategy to protect underlying needs for order and security.
Threat and the Demand for Authority
Far-right ideologies also flourish in contexts of perceived threat. Research demonstrates that when people are reminded of their mortality or exposed to threatening events, they shift toward authoritarian and conservative attitudes (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003). Terrorist attacks, pandemics, or social unrest can thus create fertile ground for far-right mobilisation. The far right capitalises on this by highlighting danger and promising protection through strong leadership, harsh penalties, and exclusion of outsiders.
This reliance on threat appeals is consistent with the broader finding that conservatives are more sensitive to threat-related stimuli, both psychologically and physiologically. For example, Oxley et al. (2008) found that individuals with stronger physiological reactions to threatening images (e.g., spiders, wounds) were more likely to endorse conservative positions on issues such as immigration and military spending. Such predispositions do not determine political allegiance, but they do help explain why far-right rhetoric resonates with some individuals more than others.
Why Rational Argument Often Fails
These insights explain why rational argument alone is often ineffective in challenging far-right beliefs. If beliefs are motivated by deeper psychological needs, then counter-evidence is likely to be rejected or reframed rather than absorbed. Activists who rely solely on facts may find themselves frustrated by audiences who seem impervious to reason. From a motivated cognition perspective, this is not surprising: facts that threaten one’s sense of security or belonging are unlikely to be persuasive.
Practical Strategies for Educators and Activists
Understanding the psychological underpinnings of far-right support opens the door to more effective strategies.
1. Address underlying needs rather than only the surface beliefs.
Educators and activists should recognise that far-right supporters are often seeking security and certainty. Creating spaces where people feel heard, valued, and safe can reduce the appeal of authoritarian solutions. Simply dismissing their views as ignorant may heighten defensiveness.
2. Use narrative and storytelling.
Research shows that stories can bypass defensive resistance by appealing to empathy and imagination (Green & Brock, 2000). Rather than relying solely on statistics, educators might share first-hand accounts of migrants, refugees, or minority groups. These stories humanise abstract debates and can shift perspectives more effectively than data alone.
3. Highlight shared values and common identities.
One way to counter in-group/out-group thinking is to stress broader identities that cut across divisions. Emphasising local pride, national achievements, or universal human rights can build bridges. By situating difference within a larger shared identity, the perception of threat is reduced.
4. Encourage critical thinking without ridicule.
Pedagogical strategies should build skills in recognising bias, evaluating sources, and questioning assumptions. However, these need to be framed in a way that avoids shaming students or audiences. Gentle questioning and Socratic dialogue can be more effective than confrontation.
5. Create alternative sources of certainty.
If far-right narratives appeal because they provide clarity, educators can provide alternative frameworks that also reduce uncertainty. For example, presenting social problems as complex but solvable through cooperation can offer reassurance without resorting to scapegoating. This requires framing change as manageable rather than overwhelming.
6. Leverage contact and cooperation.
Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis suggests that positive interaction between groups reduces prejudice, especially when it involves cooperation toward common goals. Community projects that bring diverse groups together can reduce fear and build empathy.
7. Anticipate and inoculate.
McGuire’s (1964) inoculation theory suggests that people can be made resistant to persuasion by being exposed to weakened forms of false arguments along with refutations. Educators might pre-empt far-right talking points by presenting them in controlled settings, then guiding participants through counter-arguments.
Summing up
The rise of the far right cannot be understood simply in terms of misinformation or political manipulation. Motivated social cognition highlights the psychological needs that such ideologies fulfil: the desire for certainty, security, and justification of existing hierarchies. Far-right narratives provide emotional comfort by turning diffuse anxieties into simple explanations with clear culprits. Rational argument alone often fails to counter this, because the beliefs are rooted in motives deeper than evidence.
Educators and activists who wish to challenge far-right influence must therefore go beyond facts. They must address the needs that drive such beliefs, creating alternative sources of security and belonging, fostering empathy through storytelling, and encouraging critical thinking in supportive contexts. By doing so, they may weaken the psychological appeal of authoritarian solutions and strengthen the resilience of democratic, inclusive values.
References
- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. Harper.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Addison-Wesley.
- Dustmann, C., & Frattini, T. (2014). The fiscal effects of immigration to the UK. The Economic Journal, 124(580), F593–F643.
- Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public narratives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 701–721.
- Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system justification and the production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33(1), 1–27.
- Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375.
- Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Motivations for judging and knowing: Implications for causal attribution. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 333–368). Guilford.
- Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing.” Psychological Review, 103(2), 263–283.
- McGuire, W. J. (1964). Inducing resistance to persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 191–229). Academic Press.
- Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, M. V., Miller, J. L., Scalora, M., … & Hibbing, J. R. (2008). Political attitudes vary with physiological traits. Science, 321(5896), 1667–1670.
- Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2003). In the wake of 9/11: The psychology of terror. American Psychological Association.
